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VALUES AND VALUE: AN ESSAY ON LIBEL REFORM
SHELDON W. HALPERN*

There may . . . be still other paths besides those that lead off
into despair or back to where we have already traveled. If law is
not an autonomous, suprahistorical entity, neither is it simply a
mass of conflicting prejudices or the clever trick of some amorphous
ruling class. History, as always, provides no clear road maps out

of the present; but the questioning of old faiths and certainties may
be able to offer clearer avenues for thought and action.'
In 1989 the United States Supreme Court celebrated the twenty-fifth

anniversary of New York Times v. Sullivan2 with a whimper. Having
declined to deal with an array of excruciatingly difficult and significant
problems, 3 the Court chose to take one case of less than earth-shattering

import 4 which it used only to engage in a scholastic exegesis of the doctrine
of de novo appellate review. Indeed, each of the five opinions5 took pains

to adumbrate the limited nature of what the Court undertook to do,
6
expressly avoiding important substantive issues.
A quarter century in which the Court first enunciated a profound
change in the law of defamation, and then elaborated an intricate, cumbersome balancing mechanism, seemingly has culminated in judicial ex* Associate Professor of Law, The Ohio State University College of Law. B.A. 1957,
Cornell University; L.L.B. 1959, Cornell University. I am appreciative of the helpful comments
and research assistance I received from Lisa Vaughn Merrill and Keith Shumate of the Ohio
State University College of Law, Class of 1991, and special thanks are due Dr. Dorit Samuel.
1. N. ROSENBERG, PROTECTING TEE BEST MEN 268 (1986) (footnote omitted).

2. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
3. Thus, it declined to resolve the issue of distinguishing constitutionally protected,
albeit scurrilous, matters of "opinion" from actionable defamatory "fact" (Ollman v. Evans,
750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985); Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp. v. Jacobson, 827 F.2d 1119 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1302
(1988)); or to determine the permissible limits of the award of presumed and punitive damages
(DiSalle v. P.G. Publishing Co., 375 Pa. Super. 510, 544 A.2d 1345 (1988), app. denied, 557
A.2d 724, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3216 (1989); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v.
Jacobson, supra); or to clarify the anomalous position of the "privilege" of neutral reportage
(DiSalle v. P.G. Publishing Co., supra).
4. Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 109 S. Ct. 2678 (1989).
5. Justice Stevens (for himself and seven other justices), the separate concurrence of
Justice Scalia and the additional concurring opinions of Justices White, Blackmun, and
Kennedy. Id.
6. "There is some debate as to whether the element of falsity must be established by
clear and convincing evidence or by a preponderance of the evidence ....
We express no view
on this issue." Harte-Hanks, 109 S. Ct. at 2682 n.2 (Stevens, J.). See Justice Blackmun's
concurring opinion, id. at 2699-700 (noting the reluctance to deal with issues of neutral
reportage and the relationship of form and content of the defamatory utterance to the question
of malice).
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haustion and ennui. Following the unanimous Sullivan decision that, for
the first time, made it clear that first amendment values are implicated by
the common law of defamation, 7 difficult and important constitutional doctrine emerged from closely divided and occasionally bitterly antagonistic
Supreme Court opinions. The rather awesome matrix by which the law of
defamation is constitutionally defined today owes much to the exigencies of
the creation of rickety majorities. The fragmented opinions of the 1960s and
70s that created the groundwork-from Curtis through Rosenbloom 9 to
Gertz'Q-were echoed, more acerbically, in the divided opinions of the mid-

7. Sullivan's express holding, that a public official is prohibited "from recovering
damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the
statement was made with 'actual malice'-that is, with knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not" (376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964)), coupled with
language making it clear that the burden was on the plaintiff to demonstrate falsity and that
the findings of the trier of fact were subject to de novo appellate review, served as the basic
text from which the later extensions and refinements grew.
Much has been written about Sullivan and its progeny, starting with Kalven, The New
York Times Case: A Note on 'The Central Meaning of the First Amendment,' 1964 Sup. CT.
Rv. 191. Exemplary contemporaneous commentary is collected in Smolla, Let the Author
Beware: The Rejuvenation of the American Law of Libel, 132 U. PA. L. Rav. 1, at 7, n.49
(1983). Of the more recent works, compare Lewis, New York Times v. Sullivan Reconsidered:
Time to Return to "The CentralMeaning of the First Amendment, " 83 COLUM. L. Rav. 603
(1983) and Epstein, Was New York Times v. Sullivan Wrong?, 53 U. Cm. L. Rav. 782 (1986).
See generally Halpern, Of Libel, Language and Law: New York Times v. Sullivan at TwentyFive, 68 N.C.L. Ray. 273 (1990) and Smolla, supra.
Sullivan, of course, may be read on many levels, from its pivotal role in the civil rights
movement of the 1960s to its constitutional reversal of theretofore accepted common-law
doctrine.
The Court's opinion ... aimed at three general goals: (1) to eliminate yet
another weapon in the arsenal of segregationists in the South; (2) to reformulate the
law of libel and thereby to eliminate what Justice Brennan called "the chilling"
effect of traditional defamation laws; (3) most ambitiously, to link the changes in
libel law to a new constitutional approach to free-speech issues, one that supposedly
broke away from old legal formulas.
N. RoSENBERG, supra note 1, at 243.
8. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) ("majority" holding, created
when Justices Black and Douglas chose to disagree less with Justices Warren, Brennan, and
White than with the other four Justices, that the Sullivan malice standard-knowledge of
falsity or reckless disregard with respect thereto-applies to public figure plaintiffs as well as
to public officials). This holding recently received clearer judicial imprimatur, by way of
dictum, in Harte-Hanks, 109 S.Ct. at 2684-85. See Halpern, supra note 7, at 280-82.
9. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971) (a plurality opinion applying
the Sullivan malice standard to any defamation action involving matters of public concern,
subsequently overruled by a bare majority in Gertz three years later).
10. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (a five Justice majority holding
that a private figure plaintiff is not constitutionally required to demonstrate fault beyond
negligence to maintain a defamation action and that neither punitive nor presumed damages
are available to a plaintiff who does not demonstrate fault amounting to knowledge of falsity
or reckless disregard with respect thereto).
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1980s:" Bose, 12 Greenmoss, 3 Hepps,14 and Liberty Lobby. 5 The ringing
reaffirmation of Sullivan and its progeny by the Chief Justice 6 in the 1988
Falwell opinion 7 not only may have seemed gratuitous; 8 the Court also
may be signaling its weariness with the great defamation issues.' 9
The issues, however, will not go away. Nor can concentration on exegesis
of the refinements continue to divert attention from those matters vital both
to individual and societal freedom. Neither judicial nor academic fatigue
can long serve to avoid coming to grips with the serious value questions
underlying the chaos that is the modem American law of defamation.
BALANCE, CHAOS, AND THE CALL FOR CHANGE

In its generalized form, 20 Sullivan imposed upon the common-law tort
a constitutional requirement that the plaintiff demonstrate, with convincing
clarity, that the defendant was at fault in publishing a false 2' defamatory
utterance. Justice Brennan apparently contemplated a delicate balancing of
the interest in reputation and the demands of the first amendment by
substantive considerations of fault and procedural hurdles relating to the

I1.See generally Halpern, supra note 7 and Smolla, Dun & Bradstreet, Hepps, and
Liberty Lobby: A New Analytic Primer on the Future Course of Defamation, 75 GEo. L.J.
1519 (1987).
12. Bose Corporation v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984)
(attempting to define the scope of de novo appellate review, the Court divided six to three).
13. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985) (a five to
four Court, holding that a private plaintiff need not prove constitutional malice to recover
presumed or punitive damages if the utterance complained of does not involve a matter of
public concern-reincarnation of Rosenbloom in a different context).
14. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986) (holding, by a five to
four vote, that a private figure must prove falsity, at least in an action against a "media"
defendant).
15. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (holding, in a six to three
split, that the "convincing clarity" standard of proof of malice is applicable to motions for
summary judgment).
16. Justice Rehnquist, in the past, had been considerably less than enthusiastic about
the Court's constitutionalization of the tort of defamation.
17. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
18. Prompting the observation by Justice White that Sullivan "has little to do with this
case." Id. at 57 (White, J., concurring).
19. As Professor Smolla has noted, "Iclertain members of the Court, in fact, seem
weary of the whole business of libel and the first amendment." Smolla, supra note 11, at
1565 (noting also Justice Rehnquist's "chill on both your houses" comment during oral
argument of Liberty Lobby).
20. Le., extending beyond the Sedition Act concerns motivating Justice Brennan to leave
the widest possible room for criticism of the official conduct of public officials. See Halpern,
supra note 7, at 277-78.
21. Although Sullivan made it clear that the plaintiff must demonstrate falsity, changing
the common-law defense of truth, and that the plaintiff must demonstrate the defendant's
knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard with respect thereto by clear and convincing evidence,
the Court has left open the question whether the convincing clarity standard applies to
plaintiff's proof of falsity. See Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 109 S.
Ct. 2678, 2682 n.2 (1989).
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burden and quantum of proof. The Court left to succeeding cases the task
of extending and configuring this balance more clearly and specifically. In
the process, as the paradigm changed from a public official complaining of
widely publicized criticism of official conduct to a variety of contexts, the
delicacy of the balance gave way to a constitutionalized law of defamation
embodied in a structure of curlicues and refinements.
Constitutional doctrine became a function of the plaintiff's status and
the nature of the defamatory utterance; the constitutional standards for
determining liability and permissible damages varied with the public or
private nature of the plaintiff and the public or private "concern" of the
libel. Instead of a constitutional paradigm, we have a matrix. 22 With
standards of fault and recovery dependent upon elusive definitions of status
and context, not much is predictable apart from the general assumption
that a plaintiff in a defamation action will have a very difficult time.
To
2
one examining the cases the law today might well seem capricious. 3
The fact of a chaotic legal structure provides the only real consensus
of considered thought in this area. There is little doubt that the law of
24
defamation is needlessly complex and that it fails essentially of its purpose.
As Dean Bezanson has observed:
For those whose interest is in protecting reputation, today's libel
tort fails in almost all respects to do so. It underprotects the
community-based interest in reputation, and overprotects the reputationally-unrelated interests in truth, responsible journalism, and
freedom from emotional harm. [F]or those who placed faith in the
privileges created by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and its
progeny, today's libel tort must be discouraging, if not utterly
devastating, for it falls substantially short of safeguarding press
freedom and fails to safeguard individual reputation as well. [T]oday's
libel tort is profoundly and fundamentally disquieting in a society
that attempts to strike a balance between reputation and freedom

22. For a more graphic presentation of the combinations and permutations of the
defamation matrix, see

HALPERN, TnE LAW OF DEFAMATION, PRIVACY, PuBLICITY AND "MoRAL
RiGHTs": CASES AND MATERIALS ON PROTECTION OF PERsoNALrrY INTERESTS 382 (1988). I have

elsewhere suggested that "the rococo law of defamation today is in many ways similar to the
ancient world of Ptolemaic epicycles: it has so many complexities and legal curlicues that it
too is intelligible, if at all, only to a learned few who, with more candor than their priestly
predecessors, confess largely to inability to predict the future." Halpern, supra note 7, at 295.
The epicyclic cosmology was a way of reconciling a geocentric, circular vision of the universe
with inconsistent observed celestial phenomena; it involved a theoretical structure so complex
as to be inaccessible and unintelligible to all but a handful of priests who, learned in the
arcana, could pretend to an ability to predict events.
23. See, e.g., Bezanson, The Libel Tort Today, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 535, 543 (1988)
("recovery by any plaintiff is more likely to be the product of chance than of any systematic
pattern reflecting reputational interests").
24. See Halpern, supra note 7, at 311-12.
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of expression. Change in the libel system is therefore an imperative. 25
Such change-as contemplated by most current reform proposals-

appears to mean trading the complexity of fault for a radical reduction in
the monetary value of a defamation suit, through either the elimination or

the severe limitation of money damages. Such proposals assume that the
prospect of paying large judgments provides the most serious "chill" on
free expression and that fundamental protection of the individual's interest
in reputation need not be based on the same kind of damages complex that
protects other, more tangible interests.

Certainly, monetary inflation, both in terms of the carrot for the
plaintiff and the stick for the defendant, is an undeniable fact of modern
defamation life. The present constitutional matrix for liability and damages
serves the doubly deleterious purpose of radically increasing the price of

defamation actions for all parties while radically reducing the plaintiff's
possibility of ultimate recovery. By a perverse application of concepts of

risk and return, a consequence of the present pattern of constitutionalization
has been an enormous escalation in the stakes. At least for the public figure
plaintiff, the extraordinarily high constitutional malice requirement necessitates the dedication of litigation energies to uncovering shockingly reprehensible conduct, well beyond matters of professional dereliction.
Consequently, every significant libel case inevitably carries with it a foundation for punitive damages. Concomitantly, what would otherwise be a
limited pre-trial procedure becomes an egregiously expensive burrowing into
the defendant's conduct and motives, opening up for examination the entire
editorial process. 26 Correlatively, even for certain private plaintiffs, the
present constitutional damages rules2 7 put a premium on a demonstration

25. Bezanson, supra note 23, at 556. Twelve years earlier, prior to the most recent
complications, Professor Christie noted: "The law in the area of injury to reputation is on
the verge of chaos. Attempts by the Court to eliminate confusion have almost invariably
increased it." Christie, Injury to Reputation and the Constitution, 75 MIcH. L. Rnv. 43, 63
(1976).
26. See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153.
A plaintiff, under the Sullivan standard, establishes requisite malice only by demonstrating, if not defendant's actual knowledge of the facts, then defendant's
subjective awareness of probable falsity. The consequence of the need for such an
inquiry is extraordinarily extensive and expensive discovery proceedings in which the
plaintiff seeks to discover not what the defendant felt or wanted (the presence of a
"malicious" state of mind), but what the defendant knew or thought, or, from all
of the surrounding circumstances, should have known or thought. In short, virtually
the entire process underlying the publication is placed in issue and must be examined.
The result is that while we have a clear, carefully defined constitutional criterion
(however unreal) called "malice," we concomitantly and necessarily have institutionalized an elaborate, expensive and ad hoc procedure that inhibits counsel's ability
to predict little more than the expense of a defamation action.
Halpern, supra note 7, at 279-80 (footnotes omitted).
27. See supra notes 10 and 13.
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of the reprehensible nature of the defendant's conduct.3 The strong impetus

to portray the defendant not only as unprofessionally in error but as venal,
reckless and an unworthy member of society, exacerbated by the fact that
most substantial plaintiffs' verdicts are reversed or substantially reduced on
29
appeal, produces inflated demands and verdicts.
By assuming the centrality of these dollar issues rather than the structure
that has produced them, reform proposals, such as those contemplated by
the Model Communicative Torts Act (the project which gave rise to this

symposium) and the Annenberg Libel Reform Proposal, 0 would effectively
take away both the carrot and the stick, substituting for the present model
a declaratory judgment proceeding, a no-fault/no-damages inquiry into
truth.31 Notwithstanding their obvious appeal, these proposals, appearing
both to give and to take evenhandedly, are unworkable, unrealistic, and
unresponsive to the needs of the reputational interest.

28.
[B]ecause the recovery of presumed [and punitive] damages is so closely linked to
proof of New York Times actual malice, defamation plaintiffs have an apparent
incentive to introduce the "actual malice" issue into cases in which a finding for
the plaintiff on that issue would not otherwise be a prerequisite to liability.
LeBel, Reforming the Tort of Defamation: An Accommodation of the Competing Interests
Within the Current Constitutional Framework, 66 NEB. L. REv. 249, 304-05 (1987) (footnote
omitted).
29. Id. at 305 ("evidence introduced regarding the aggravated wrongdoing of the defendant ... may lead a fact finder to be more inclined to raise the level of damages awarded to
a plaintiff"). A recent egregious example is a Florida jury's verdict of $100 million on a
defamation claim asserted by GTE Corporation against Home Shopping Network. "GTE Wins
$100 Million Libel Case," N.Y. Times, August 3, 1989, § D, p.l, col. 6. Home Shopping
Network had charged in a press release that poor equipment installation by GTE had hurt
Home Shopping's business and it instituted an action against GTE for $500 million in lost
profits and $1 billion in punitive damages. The libel award for GTE was on its counterclaim
based on the press release, Of course, "[mlost libel awards, especially those of large amounts,
are reduced on appeal." Id.
30. REPORT OF THE LBEL REFORM PROJECT OF THE ANNENBERG WASHINGTON PROGRAM:
PROPOSAL FOR TIM REFORM OF LmEL LAW 9 (1988) (hereinafter THE ANNENBERG REPORT).

31. THE

ANNENBERG REPORT,

by allowing either party to turn a defamation action into

a no-fault/no-damages declaratory judgment action (as weil as by using retraction or reply to
preempt any action) effectively eliminates all money damages other than counsel fees. THE
MODEL COMMUmCATIV
TORTS AcT similarly provides for an expedited declaratory judgment
action limited to the issue of truth (§§ 3-101, 9-107). Although it does not give the defendant
an option to convert an action for damages into such a declaratory judgment proceeding, a
plaintiff who seeks the alternative of damages has a heavy burden of proving reputational
injury, while the damages are limited to "reasonable compensation based on proof of lost
earnings, diminished earning capacity, lost profits, loss of commercial value, or any other
pecuniary loss that proximately results from the injury." §§ 3-101, 9-101 (emphasis added).
The declaratory judgment approach to libel reform owes much to the work of Professor Marc
Franklin, although he contemplated parallel, alternative schemes whereby the plaintiff could
choose either a no-fault declaration of falsity or an action for damages subject essentially to
the present complex rules. See Franklin, A DeclaratoryJudgment Alternative to Current Libel
Law, 74 CAL. L. Rnv. 809 (1986) (hereinafter Alternative), building on the earlier Franklin,
Good Names and Bad Law: A Critique of Libel Law and a Proposal, 18 U.S.F. L. REv. 1
(1983) (hereinafter Proposal).
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ON VIEWING WITlH ALARiM: THE POWER OF ARROGANCE

The peculiar genius of Sullivan was in the promulgation of a constitutional doctrine of fault and falsity to harmonize the law of defamation with
first amendment values. The doctrinal concern was not whether the press,
as such, behaved well or badly or whether a particular plaintiff deserved a
certain amount of damages. In a sense, despite the major change it created
in the common law, the Sullivan doctrine was conservative. The doctrine
assumed no underlying value judgments favoring either the plaintiff or the
defendant; the concern was to circumscribe the defamation action to the
extent necessary to ensure the vigor of the first amendment. Justice Brennan
did not minimize or disparage the importance of protecting reputation, nor
do his opinions indicate anything but a concern with the need to give speech
breathing room through a controlled margin for error. 32 Sullivan and its
progeny, in significantly altering the common law by the erection of constitutional hurdles in the way of recovery, also rejected the absolutist position
(urged by Justices Black and Douglas) that simply would bar actions for
defamation.33 Whatever one's opinion of the multi-standard, status-based
constitutional structure, the Sullivan doctrine, as amplified, was created to
limit and to modify the common-law remedy, not to eliminate it.
For a variety of reasons-perhaps inertia, the inexorable continuation
of a process of constitutionalization once begun, perhaps deep-seated conviction coupled with the inevitable sense of righteousness that follows from
arguing "for" the first amendment, and perhaps the power of concentrated
ownership of print and television-the nature of the inquiry seems to have
shifted, and the underlying premises of Sullivan have become diffused in a
flood of media and academic "viewing with alarm." 3 4 The issue for many

32. Indeed, it is ironic that, in Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1979), Justice Brennan,
dissenting from a decision refusing to recognize a due process claim arising out of officially
sanctioned defamation, took great pains to underscore his belief that "the enjoyment of one's
good name and reputation has been recognized repeatedly in our cases as being among the
most cherished of rights enjoyed by a free people, and therefore as falling within the concept
of personal 'liberty' [contemplated by the due process clause]." Id. at 722-23 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
33. It is this fundamental value balancing that prompted the strong and continuing
objections of Justices Black and Douglas to any but an absolute application of the first
amendment to bar actions for defamation. Albeit from a different perspective, their Cassandralike predictions of disaster following from any attempt to balance the first amendment strictures
with competing interests in reputation seem to have been accurate; see, e.g., New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 293-97 (1964); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130,
171 (1967) ("It strikes me that the Court is getting itself in the same quagmire in the field of
libel in which it is now helplessly struggling in the field of obscenity. No one, including this
Court, can know what is and what is not constitutionally ... libelous under this Court's
rulings.").
34. See Halpern, supra note 7, at 288.
There is ...a strong and experienced defamation "defendant's lobby," vigilant and
articulate. At the same time, the call for an expansive reading of the first amendment
is-and ought to be-an appealing one. To the extent that a matter implicates the
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is not whether a given policy is consistent with first amendment freedom.
Rather, the focus has become whether a particular decision and the concomitant doctrinal ramifications are "good" or "bad" for the press. Each
new restriction on the common-law action is hailed as a further support in
the structure of freedom necessary to a democratic society. Each move to
allow a plaintiff some room to recover for injury to reputation is seen as
a threat to fundamental liberty. The real "chilling effect" may be felt by
those to whom every defamation action is not simply an unprincipled attack
on the constitution by a thin-skinned plaintiff nor every meaningful judgment against outrageous communicative conduct a harbinger of the end of
a free society:
[T]here is an orthodoxy in libel law practice and scholarship today.
Its proponents zealously protect media interests and are quick to
denounce departures from the true faith as "anti-first amendment."
They seem never to have encountered an absolute privilege they
didn't like, nor a qualified privilege that shouldn't be extended.
The harm inflicted by speech is seldom regarded by the orthodox
view as significant enough to warrant compensation. Indeed, any
prospect of tort liability is seen as an intolerable threat to first
amendment values.35
With the inquiry framed in terms of abstract allegiance to first amendment
values, meaningful debate is not easily diverted from journalistic parochialism. Journalists, of course, are in an anomalous position. As the most
visible force giving meaning to the first amendment, journalists must have
36
room to function without the accountability inherent in other professions.
At the same time, the concentrated power of the press and television-the
corporatization and consolidation of a polyglot mixture of competing publications-and the uniform intrusiveness and celebrity of television "news,"
producing at its worst self-referential, self-laudatory and self-conscious
journalism, leaves these guardians of liberty unrespected and unloved. 37 As
Fred W. Friendly38 observed, with respect to television journalism:

first amendment it implicates matters at the heart of American democracy. The call
to arms, particularly for the academic scholar, is irresistible and leaves only to the
most sensitive hearer the cry of the individual injured by the defamatory falsehood.
The question then, why impair the long established right of the injured individual,
can be heard only faintly and those who raise it risk much.
Id.
35. LeBel, Emotional Distress, the First Amendment, and "This Kind of Speech": A
HereticalPerspective on Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 60 U. COL. L. Rlv. 315, 318 (1989).
36. "While not 'professionals' by any standard definition, journalists still belong to a
special occupation. They have been granted privileges by the Constitution." T. GOLDSTEIN,
THE NEws AT ANY CosT: How JouNAnIsTs ComaROasE Tma ETHICS TO SAPE TH NEWS
18 (1985).
37. Id.
38. Edward R. Murrow Professor Emeritus, Columbia Graduate School of Journalism.
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In the final analysis, responsibility rests with top management.
The current chief executive officers of the major networks have
emerged from the ranks of money managers and manufacturers
who are not steeped in the tradition and standards of broadcast
journalism.... The tradition today has become the constant crush
for hot pictures in pursuit of ratings and revenues, not journalistic
integrity.3 9

The problem is compounded by the arrogance that seems to accompany

power and celebrity, an institutional unwillingness to concede
error or
4
meaningfully to atone for the injury inflicted by that error. 0
Consider the case of DiSalle v. P.G. Publishing Co., 4 1 in which a
Pennsylvania appellate court upheld a jury verdict of $210,000 in compensatory damages and $2,000,000 in punitive damages predicated upon findings
that the defendant newspaper had published false and defamatory material
concerning the plaintiff both with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity
(the constitutional "malice" requisite to a determination of liability) and
with ill will amounting to an intention to harm the plaintiff (the commonlaw malice requisite to the recovery of punitive damages). After the United
States Supreme Court denied certiorari the judgment was paid (together

with $561,000 in interest). 42 The defendant continued to insist that none of

the reporters or editors involved in the article "believe they have done

anything wrong [and that] such a large award [will] probably chill news
coverage at other papers. '

43

In reporting this story, The New York Times

only briefly dealt with the conduct giving rise to the damages. Instead, it
devoted most of its coverage to spokespeople who viewed with alarm the
action of the jury and the courts and to commentators who raised the
prospect of a "chill" on aggressive news coverage. 44 From the lack of any
comment on the defendant's conduct, 45 one would be hard put to realize

39. Friendly, On Television: News, Lies and Videotape, N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1989, § 2,
p. 1, 27, col. 5 (Nat'l Ed.).
40. See T. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 36, at 236-37:

Although most papers now run corrections boxes, many papers are still reluctant
to admit they are wrong. "We'd sooner drown our children," Michael Gartner, then
of the Des Moines Register and Tribune Company, told a group of Florida lawyers
and journalists in the winter of 1984. "What do many papers and editors-and their
lawyers, I should add-do when a paper errs? We equivocate. We bluster. We alibi.
We hide behind technicalities, We hide behind secretaries. We hide behind lawyers."
41. 375 Pa. Super. 510, 544 A.2d 1345 (1988), app. denied, 557 A.2d 724 (Pa. 1989),
cert. denied, P.G. Publishing Co. v. DiSalle, 109 S. Ct. 3216 (1989).
42. Pittsburgh Paper Pays $2.8 Million Libel Award, N.Y. Times, July 12, 1989, p.13,
col. 7 (Nat'l Ed.).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. It has been suggested that "[The New York] Times has viewed just about every
decision that has gone against the press as a fresh menace to freedom, no matter how
inconsequential." T. GoLDsTEN, supra note 36, at 192.

The First Amendment is a motherhood and apple pie issue to the media; and
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that both trial and appellate judges had concurred in a jury finding of
46
gratuitous and malicious conduct on the part of the defendant.
The consequence of such continuing refusal to acknowledge, let alone
ameliorate, 47 conduct that in others would be considered outrageous, is
inevitably greater distrust and, ultimately, an undesirable weakening of those
first amendment protections that are truly necessary. 48 The rigid use of

The New York Times, as the country's premier paper, has taken the lead in its
defense....
The attitude of the paper was summed up by A. M. Rosenthal in a speech to
a group of lawyers [the Fordham Law Alumni Association, on January 30, 1976]:
"The latest and perhaps most dangerous threat to the existence of the free press
comes from ... court rulings ......
Id.
46. The jury had been specifically charged with respect both to constitutional malice, in
the sense of reckless disregard for the truth, as a condition to liability, and common-law
malice, in the sense of an intention to harm, as a condition to the award of punitive damages.
DiSalle, 375 Pa. Super. at 521, 547, 544 A.2d at 1350, 1364. The Pennsylvania Superior Court
noted the trial judge's finding that
the Defendant's actions evidenced a particular disregard for its responsibilities as a
major news gathering and conveying source. Far from attempting to report dispassionately on a dispute which had ripened into a protracted legal proceeding, the
purpose of the Post-Gazette was to sensationalize this bitter family controversy by
lurid suggestions of fraud and sexual impropriety by a man whose reputation was
above reproach. It is not simply that the article ... was replete with inaccuracies;
it was more that the editors in charge ... found it necessary to insert an unfounded
and sensational element to fill a "hole" in the story [and] highlighted it in such a
way as to leave the natural impression on the part of the reader that a serious
question of Mr. DiSalle's competence and integrity had been entertained in a court
of law.
Id. at 569, 544 A.2d at 1376. The findings were not questioned on appeal. Id. at 530, 560,
544 A.2d at 1355, 1371.
Similarly disturbing is the response of Time magazine to the carefully deliberated jury
verdict in the highly publicized action brought by Ariel Sharon for material published about
him in the magazine. The jury had expressly found the article false and defamatory and
strongly criticized Time's lack of professionalism, but also found that the defendant had not
acted with constitutional "malice"-knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truthand accordingly found the defendant not liable. Each side was then quick to proclaim victory,
moral or otherwise.
[Notwithstanding the jury's finding that] certain Time employees ... acted negligently and carelessly in reporting and verifying the information . . . Time issued a
statement saying that the case should never have reached an American courtroom,
that it was now over and that "Time has won it....
We continue to have the
utmost confidence ...
in our editorial staff and our editorial procedures" ....
Time's managing editor, ... saying he disagreed with the jury's comment about
negligence, declared, "We are totally confident that the story is substantially true."
Time Cleared of Libeling Sharon but Jurors Criticize its Reporting, N.Y. Times, Jan. 25,
1985, p.1, col. 2. For a detailed discussion of this litigation and the behavior of the parties,
see R. SMOLLA, SUING THE PREss 80-100 (1986).
47. Consider the brief and uneventful life of the National News Council, a voluntary
journalistic attempt at self-examination and oversight that expired for lack of meaningful
media support. See T. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 36, at 238-39.
48. See, e.g., id. at 192:
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apparent constitutional principle to avoid responsibility for unprofessional
conduct serves to undermine what otherwise might be appealing proposals
for libel reform. The assumption that widely circulated publications or
broadcasts, be they Time magazine or The National Enquirer or Sixty
Minutes, would be significantly impressed by a non-monetary judgment
declaring the defamatory falsity of a purported news item confuses professional pride with powerful arrogance. In short, recent experience indicates
that, from the defendant's point of view, a declaration of falsity would not
49

mean very much.
However, the task of the law of defamation is the protection of the
individual's interest in reputation, not the promotion of responsible speech.
My unkind remarks about the behavior of the press in the face of clearly

demonstrated irresponsibility are not a plea for using the law of defamation
to make the press behave better.5 0 It is not at all clear that we really want
or should have a well-behaved press." Before there was any talk of "chill,"
there was a long pre-Sullivan history (and the English have a continuing
history) of the coexistence of a vigorous, if not disorderly, press with a
money damages-based libel law. Today, notwithstanding prophecies to the

contrary, there is little hard evidence, although much speculative assumption,
of significant press self-censorship.
The law of libel does provide a price for crossing a line; a price that,
when the irresponsibility is coupled with an intention to harm, can turn
into a penalty. That, however, is a consequence and is not the primary
purpose of the law. The absence of motivation for more professional and
responsible, if not decent, behavior is not per se an argument against a
In its earnest desire to protect the First Amendment, the Times often has
overreacted and overplayed stories involving press-law issues. That, I think, has
unintentionally been harmful in the long run to the First Amendment. What the
Times has done smacks of special pleading. It and other major papers are in danger
of crying wolf too often ....
In a speech [on March 22,] 1984 at the University of
Michigan, [Floyd] Abrams said that "so long as the press focuses intently on only
one word out of one Amendment of the Constitution-even the First Amendmentit focuses too narrowly. And unpersuasively. And ultimately self-defeatingly."
49. See Franklin, Alternative, supra note 31, at 839.
If those who publish defamatory communications were freed from [the] threat [of
money damages], the only checks on abuse would be internal restraints, professional
standards (in the case of the press), and the deterrent effect produced by whatever
nonmonetary relief scheme was put into place. Given the almost total failure of the
first two of those alternatives to produce a satisfactory level of claims and litigation,
one should be extremely skeptical about the ability of the third option to serve as
an effective means of keeping the harm caused by the publication of falsehood to
a socially acceptable level.
LeBel, supra note 28, at 307.
50. As Floyd Abrams has observed: "A libel case is not a journalism seminar. It is
important not to confuse what the law requires of a journalist with what the deans of
journalism schools might think is the best way to go about being a reporter." Appeals Court
Turns Down Suit Citing Libel in Use of Quotation, N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1989, p. 19, col. 2
(Nat'l Ed.).
51. See Reston, Reputation and the Modern JournalisticImperative, 74 CALIF. L. Rv.
753 (1986).
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proposal that would remove the threat of substantial damages as a "chill"

on free speech if it adequately recognized the reputational interest injured
by defamation. This consideration, however, must color the trade-off relieving the plaintiff from the almost impossible burden of proving constitutional malice and eliminating meaningful damages. While it does provide
context, the question remains: does a formal declaration of falsity remove
the sting and its poison so that the interest in reputation is realistically
protected? I think not.
QUESTIONS OF VALUE
The position of the reputation interest in the scheme of values in our
communication-dominated society is a matter of some debate.5 2 So too, no
clear consensus exists as to the dimensions of that "mysterious thing [that]
inheres in the social apprehension that we have of each other. '53 Neverthe-

less, whether considered as "a melange of several distinct concepts" 5 4 or a
single, undifferentiated interest, reputation is one manifestation of the
human personality. Defamation is an assault on that personality. Smirking
at the defamation plaintiff is too easy; 55 it is too facile a step from the
belief that "everyone will be world famous for fifteen minutes,"

6

to the

proposition that community perception, that "web of connections" 57 defining one's reputation, is too evanescent to be taken seriously. 5 Societal

52. See, e.g., Bellah, The Meaning of Reputation in American Society, 74 CAUF. L.
Rnv. 743 (1986); Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the
Constitution, 74 CAUF. L. REv. 691 (1986); Reston, supra note 51.
53. Post, supra note 52, at 692.
Although there has been considerable scholarly attention directed to the definition
and articulation of "the First Amendment interest" in protecting expression, there
has been relatively little discussion of the nature and importance of "the State's
interest" in protecting reputation. The latter inquiry, of course, requires an exploration into the obscure purposes and functions of common law defamation, which
is not a journey that many modem commentators have been willing to undertake,
especially given the attractive and well-traveled alternative routes of constitutional
analysis. Yet it is all too easy to assume that everyone knows the value of reputation,
and to let the matter drop with the obligatory reference to Shakespeare's characterization of a "good name" as the "immediate jewel" of the soul.
Id.
54. Id. at 740.
55. "He jests at scars, that never felt a wound." W. SHAKcsPEAsR, Tim TRAGEDY OF
RoEo AN JuLrmT, Act II, Scene ii.
56. Andy Warhol, quoted in J. BARxIErr, FAMIIAR QUOTATIONS 908 (15th ed. 1980).
57. Bellah, supra note 52, at 743.
[R]eputation by its very nature is indelibly social.... Reputation is the extension
and elaboration of that recognition which lies at the basis of our social existence.
Thus, although we think of a person as "having" a reputation, reputation is not a
property or possession of individuals-it is a relation between persons.
Id.
58. See, e.g., Anderson, Reputation, Compensation, and Proof, 25 Wm. & MARY L.
REv. 747, 777 (1984) ("Many of our ideas about reputation are products of a simpler era....
In today's pluralistic society, much is tolerated and little is universally condemned.").
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saturation with celebrity, media-created transitory fame59 and the craving
for exposure at any cost can too easily obscure the reality of the deep harm
that can result from the publication of a defamatory utterance. It is tempting
to dismiss the excesses of some damage awards as jury vindictiveness toward
a powerful press rather than, perhaps, overzealous sympathy for an injured

victim. The publicity afforded the sensational libel suit brought by wellknown and well-off individuals helps foster the image of manipulative
plaintiffs doing violence to the first amendment; an image that diverts
attention from the reality of the tort. 60 Indeed, if we do value that intangible
personality interest in external perception called "reputation," we must not
trivialize the tort directed to reputation in the process of accommodating
protection of that interest to the exigencies of the first amendment.
Presuming that there is something of value in reputation and that a
tort directed to that interest requires redress, rather than that a claim
founded on that interest is inherently suspect, the burden must be on those
who would significantly vary the remedial scheme from that applicable to

other interest-invasive acts. Before the well-established remedy for breaches
of societally imposed duties-money damages-may be eliminated, a com-

pelling case must be made that money damages are neither necessary nor
appropriate. Notwithstanding the important work that has been done to

address this concern, such a case has not been made.
Certainly, the roots of the law of defamation lay in the communal-

spiritual realm rather than in the individual-pecuniary world. The ancient
remedy for "bearing false witness" involved spiritual atonement and cleansing for the defamer rather than compensation for the defamed. 6' However,

59. See Bellah, supra note 52, at 747. Consider the role of the media in making, and
unmaking, political figures:
[I]n the personalized politics of recent years the "charisma" of the leader may
be almost entirely a product of media exposure and, by the same token, can disappear
in the same way. Few people, for example, knew anything about what Jimmy Carter
had done as governor of Georgia, and those who did were not encouraged. Carter
was created by his media exposure in the primary campaign and, one would have
to say, in considerable measure destroyed by media exposure as President.
Id. (footnote omitted).
60. See Bezanson, The Libel Suit in Retrospect: What Plaintiffs Want and What Plaintiffs
Get, 74 CtIrF. L. REv. 789 (1986).
The view of libel plaintiffs as persons with no confidence in their claim who
manipulate the legal process for personal ends seems greatly overbroad.... Rather
than suing for improper or manipulative reasons, most plaintiffs seem to resort to
Nor does the
litigation as a means of self-help and legitimation of their claim ....
fact that some plaintiffs use the legal system to pursue a meritless claim discredit
the motives of all plaintiffs. Rather ... most plaintiffs sue for the simple reason
that they have no effective alternative for redressing reputational harm.
Id. at 807.
61. See L.

ELDREDGE,

THE LAW oF DEF. aMAION 5 (1978). The canonical roots of

defamation go back at least to the time of William the Conqueror, who established separate
church courts to administer the canon law remedy of defamation, predicated upon the "sin"
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the civil, pecuniary nature of the tort remedy has been established for
almost three hundred years.6 2 Finding a firm traditional or historical justification for confining the law of defamation to a narrower remedial scheme
than is available for other torts would be difficult. On the contrary,
historically, the remedial envelope for defamation at common law, with its
strict liability antecedents and presumptions of falsity and harm, was far
more expansive even than that provided for intentional torts. Historically
and intuitively, no predicate exists for the argument that for this tort-and
this tort alone-money damages are superfluous to an effective remedial
scheme.
Libel reform centered on the elimination or the severe limitation of
damages is bottomed on the assumption that damage awards in defamation
actions-entailing exposure to the vicissitudes of capricious juries-are not
required to provide an injured plaintiff "vindication," and that such vindication is all that is needed to protect the interest in reputation. Certainly,
vindication is a compelling motivation for the plaintiff injured by a defamatory utterance. 63 In a sense, defamation is unique among the torts in that
the injury from defamation is to the way others perceive the victim. Unlike
directly inflicted injuries, "repair" does not involve action by or upon the
plaintiff; rather, it requires alteration of the perception of the plaintiff by
the community, restoration of the prior perception. Theoretically, the truth
may reverse the negative impact on reputation arising from a false defamatory utterance and a public declaration of the falsity of the utterance
should restore the plaintiff's reputation. Consequently, if this kind of
restoration achieves vindication, then attainment of that restoration should
amount to complete relief and obviate the need for money damages. This
deceptively simple syllogism is flawed in at least two significant respects.
First is the assumption that a declaration of falsity or a recanting of the
defamatory utterance in fact would provide restorative vindication; second
is the assumption that restorative vindication, even if effective, is a sufficient
of bearing false witness.
A person found guilty of the sin ... was required to do public penance. The sinner,
wrapped in a white shroud, holding a lighted candle, and kneeling, acknowledged
his "false witness" in the presence of the priest and parish wardens and begged the
pardon of the injured party. This public penance gave the complainant public
vindication, but nothing more.
Id.
62. As the court noted in Crump v. Beckley Newspapers, Inc., 320 S.E.2d 70, 76 (W.
Va. 1983):
Throughout the Middle Ages, the ecclesiastical courts exercised general jurisdiction
over defamation, punishing it with penance .... It was not until the reign of Henry
VIII, that the common law courts began to exercise some jurisdiction over actions
for defamation. By the end of the sixteenth century, however, common law courts
exercised practically absolute jurisdiction over these actions.
See S. HALPERN, supra note 22, at 2-4.
63. See Bezanson, supra note 60, at 808. Dean Bezanson has concluded that "effective
response to alleged falsity, emotional relief, and vindication of reputation chiefly appear to
motivate most plaintiffs." Id.
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remedy when it has not at all been considered sufficient, or even paramount,
in our general remedial scheme for tortious conduct.
Of course, an immediate and prominent retraction, designed to be given
the same attentive circulation as the offending material, can be reasonably
effective. Such a retraction certainly would ameliorate the injury and thereby
preclude any substantial damages. However, to expect either such immediacy
or such prominence is chimerical. A delayed retraction or a judicial declaration following even an expedited court proceeding, after the damage has
been done, can never really undo that damage. Rumor is pernicious and
the truth can seldom outrun the lie. In an age of news digests, "sound
bites" and competition for a short public attention span, expecting that a
declaration of falsity, judicial or otherwise, would effectively repair the
damage or deter the offender from "standing by the story" is simply
unrealistic. 64 The easy assumption of the restorative power of a declaration
of falsity reminds one of Shaw's observation on the self-deception by which
"people persuade themselves that what is done can be undone by repentance;
that what is spoken can be unspoken by withdrawing it; that what is true
can be annihilated by a general agreement to give it the lie. ' '65 A judicial
declaration or an impersonal retraction is hardly the modern analogue of
the public penance and public vindication of the ancient ecclesiastical
treatment of defamation. 6 Such a declaration may ease some of the pain
and may provide some balm for the defamed individual-it may provide
some measure of vindication-but it is naive to expect that the declaration
would undo the damage or otherwise be restorative.
Moreover, even if the truth could overtake the lie and, in fact, restore
the injured reputation, it does not follow that we thereby have provided a
reasonably complete remedy, or one appropriate to our general remedial
scheme for tortious conduct. When a tort entails physical injury, nonmonetary and complete restoration normally is not feasible. Damages are
an approximation of the cost of restoration or the monetary equivalent of
replacement. Even then, such restoration is but one element of the remedial
scheme, 67 which includes pecuniary quantification of the proximately caused
parasitic harms-pain and suffering and emotional distress-however imprecise the process. 6 Tort law also generally countenances punitive damages

64. See, e.g., supra note 46.
65. G.B. SsAW, MAN AND SurERAN, Act III, in

SEVN PLAYS

By BERNARD SHAw 517,

616 (1951).
66. See supra note 61.
67. See generally Ingber, Rethinking Intangible Injuries: A Focus on Remedy, 73 CALiF.
L. REV. 772 (1985). "lClompensation alone does not justify our tort system.... In effect,
tort law does not compensate victims; it merely shifts the loss and thus changes the victim's
identity." Id.at 786.
at 778. As Professor Ingber has observed:
68. See id.
It is difficult to justify monetary damages for intangible injuries exclusively on
the basis of victim compensation. Significantly, such injuries cannot be readily
quantified. Translating pain and suffering or emotional distress into monetary terms
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if the conduct of the defendant is sufficiently reprehensible. In short, the
remedial inquiry is not bounded by the dimensions of simple "restoration."
Indeed, something more than either compensation or restoration is involved.
The process implicates human values transcending economic exchange:
From the victim's perspective, compensation is not just reimbursement, it is making amends for the injury done by bestowing
a "consolation, a solatium." Refusal to grant damages effectively
bestows upon the injurer a form of legal "entitlement" to cause
the injury. Although money damages may not be an equivalent to
the injury experienced, they can serve as an important symbolic
means of preserving the entitlement of personal security and autonomy against infringement. 69
In the case of defamation, the human values of dignity and decency7
are particularly evident. Of course, money damages cannot restore the
damaged reputation, any more than they can restore the broken limb.
However, the inadequacy of damages as a complete restorative hardly
justifies their elimination. Indeed, perhaps even more in the case of defamation, with its affront to dignity and decency, than in other types of
tortious behavior, the entitlement consequences of the damages remedy are
singularly appropriate. To suggest that defamation plaintiffs want "vindication" is not to demonstrate that they are neither interested in nor
significantly compensated by the societal legitimization of their reputational
interest afforded by a formal award of damages. 7' Indeed, effective vindiposes tremendous problems of proof because ... no market exists to provide a
standard for compensating a victim of such a loss. Such injuries have no measurable
dimensions, mathematical or financial.
Courts have recognized that there is no exchange value for pain and suffering
or emotional distress and, therefore, have relied upon the collective judgment of
juries to quantify such injuries .... Juries are left with nothing but their consciences
to guide them.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
69. Id. at 781-82 (footnotes omitted).
Because money is highly valued in our society, we use it to measure and recognize
the worth of both tangible and intangible items. If society is to signify its commitment
to the support of psychic well-being, damages for intangible injuries must be
permitted. Compensation may restore the plaintiff's sense of self-value, and ease his
sense of outrage.
Id. at 781 (footnotes omitted). Professor Ingber argues, however, that compensation for such
psychic harms "should focus on ramifications that are quantifiable and transferable-special/
pecuniary rather than general damages. These damages ... are likely to be limited and
provable, and thus less subject to jury discretion." Id. at 785.
70. See generally Ingber, Defamation: A Conflict Between Reason and Decency, 65 VA.
L. Rav. 785 (1979).
71. The empirical work of the Iowa Libel Research Project has demonstrated the
importance of defamation plaintiffs' intangible concerns but the data hardly compel the
conclusion that damages may be obviated in an effective remedial scheme. The Iowa project,
described in detail in R. BEZaNSON, G. CRANBERG & J. SoLosKI, LMEL LAW AND THE PRESs:

MYTH AND R-uarry (1987), was designed to "explore the feasibility of non-litigation processes
through which libel disputes might be resolved." Id. at ix.
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cation-and not simply its etymological cousin, revenge 72-requires just this
kind of legitimization by societal acknowledgement. Society acknowledges
through the means that society has come to accept, money damages, that
the defamed individual has been hurt and that the defamer has acted
wrongfully. 7 To subordinate the defamation remedy is to subordinate the
injury and to devalue the reputational interest. So long as we profess to
value that interest, only the conclusion that no other method can accommodate the interest in reputation to the strictures of the first amendment
can justify a remedial scheme least consistent with that value.
By the complementary removal of the plaintiff's fault burden, libel
reform predicated upon the elimination or severe restriction of damages
also facilitates exposure of the falsity. The focus on damages, however, is
less the product of belief in the remedial sufficiency of the declaration of
falsity74 than of concern over what are viewed as capricious and vindictive
jury awards. Distrust of the jury forms a substantial part of the libel
debate. 75 The attitude is not groundless. Even allowing for the animus of
the press to any recovery of proper damages for the defendant's improper
conduct, the well-publicized and apparently arbitrary jury excesses76 certainly
lend substance to the distrust.
The apparently open-ended and unstructured awards of presumed damages are at the center of the antipathy toward the jury. Presumed damages,

72. See E. PARTRIDGE, ORiGINs: A SHORT ETYMOLOGICAL DICTIONARY

OF MODERN ENGLISH

155 (1966).
73. See, e.g., LeBel, supra note 28, at 306-07:
[L]iability for monetary damages for defamation both legitimately compensates for
real harm and reasonably deters the kind of conduct that produces such harm.
Whether one is pleased with the reality or not, it seems inherently undeniable that
the threat of monetary liability is what keeps the defamation action operating as a
constraint on the unjustified production of harm.
74. The constitutional underpinning for the no-fault approach to the issue of falsity
probably involves the elimination of damages. THE MODEL COMMUNICATIVE TORTS ACT assumes

that its severe restriction of damages would similarly pass constitutional muster (Comment to
§ 3-101). The fault/damages exchange has some constitutional logic, albeit institutional unsoundness.
75. The concurring opinion of Judge Bork in Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 997 (D.C.

Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985) articulates this distrust: "The only solution to
the problem libel actions pose would appear to be close judicial scrutiny to ensure that cases
about types of speech and writing essential to a vigorous first amendment do not reach the
jury." See Matheson, Procedurein Public Person Defamation Cases: The Impact of the First
Amendment, 66 TEx. L. REv. 215, 281 (1987) ("First amendment considerations ... should
confine the jury's role."); Van Alstyne, First Amendment Limitations on Recovery from the
Press-anExtended Comment on "The Anderson Solution," 25 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 793,
794-95 (1984).

76. See, e.g., Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Jacobson, 827 F.2d 1119 (7th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1302 (1988) (a jury award of $3,000,000 in presumed damages,
notwithstanding the absence of any proof of injury, reduced to $1.00 by the trial judge, was
reinstated to the extent of $1,000,000 on appeal; a $2,000,000 punitive damages award was

upheld); see supra note 29; Barrett, Declaratory Judgments for Libel: A Better Alternative,
74 CALIF. L. REv. 847, 856-57 (1986).

WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 47:227

"damages intended to compensate for harm that the plaintiff had not
proved was actually incurred, 7 7 are a troublesome, albeit traditional, component of the defamation cause of action. The common law, with more
respect for logic than for policy, "allows recovery of purportedly compensatory damages without evidence of actual loss. [T]he existence of injury is
presumed from the fact of publication.' '78 Concern over "[t]he largely
' 79
uncontrolled discretion of juries to award damages where there is no loss"
led to the Gertz "actual injury" rule' ° that constitutionally barred presumed
damages in the absence of a showing of defendant's knowledge of falsity
or reckless disregard with respect thereto."
Gertz did not absolutely bar presumed damages, despite clear evidence
that "the doctrine of presumed damages invites juries to punish unpopular
opinion rather than to compensate individuals for injury sustained by the
publication of a false fact. "82 However, the relation of presumed damages
to compensation for injury is too tenuous to support their inclusion in a
reasoned and effective scheme for protecting the interest in reputation.
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's parsing of the presumed damages
issue into compartments determined by the status of the parties or the
nature of the speech, such damages are inherently too speculative to be
considered proper compensation in any defamation action. At best, the
determination of presumed damages "is a very inexact and somewhat
arbitrary process." 3 The pernicious nature of substantial "compensatory"
damages in the absence of demonstrated harm is not ameliorated by the
magnitude of the defendant's fault. Even absent constitutional concerns,
the existence of a purportedly compensatory scheme that operates independently of proof of harm would be disturbing. The first amendment implications flowing from such an unbounded assessment process make it
intolerable.
77. LeBel, supra note 28, at 268.
78. Gertz v. Robert Welsh, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (Powell, J.). The doctrine of
presumed damages follows from the definition of a defamatory utterance as one that tends to
harm the reputation of the person defamed. A finding that the defendant published defamatory
matter ipso facto entails a finding that the plaintiff has been damaged.
79. Id.
80. "[The private defamation plaintiff who establishes liability under a less demanding
standard than that stated by-New York Times may recover only such damages as are sufficient
to compensate him for actual injury." Id. at 350.
81. The rule, precluding the award of presumed damages to a private plaintiff who
satisfies only the minimal constitutional fault requirement rather than Sullivan malice, was
refined in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985), to apply
only to a private plaintiff complaining of an utterance involving a matter of public concern.
See Halpern, supra note 7, at 295-99; Smolla, supra note 11, at 1535-46.
82. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349.
83. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Jacobson, 827 F.2d 1119, 1142 (7th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1302 (1988); see supra note 76. See also Anderson, supra note
58, at 749-50 ("the process of fixing an amount of presumed damages is inherently irrational");
Halpern, supra note 7, at 318 ("There simply is no rational framework within which the court
can assess the propriety of a jury's presumed damages award and thereby carry out its
constitutional review function.").
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To suggest eliminating presumed damages in all cases-the position of
virtually all current reform proposals-is not to suggest eliminating com-

pensation for intangible harm. Although assessment of presumed damages
is an idiosyncracy of defamation, the process of quantifying intangible harm
when some injury has been demonstrated is a familiar component of the
traditional tort system.14 As with compensation for other torts, the fact of
harm proximately caused by a defamatory utterance provides the basis upon
which damages may be quantified. Both direct-demonstrable reputational
harm-and indirect, parasitic injury, tangible and intangible, are properly
compensable. 5 The judicial system's long experience with emotional harm
and similar psychic damage proximately caused by tortious conduct provides
a reasoned, principled, and controllable approach to the assessment of these
damages. There is no need either radically to circumscribe recovery for the
serious, albeit intangible, injuries sustained by the defamation victim or to
eliminate real but parasitic harm and limit recovery to pecuniary injury to
reputation.16 Removing presumed damages removes the possibility of a
substantial recovery in the absence of some demonstrable injury proximately
caused by the defendant's conduct. Once the injury is demonstrated, the
system, however inexactly, can cope with compensation as it does whenever
tortious conduct causes harm. s7

84. See supra notes 67 and 68.
85. As amplified in Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1977), Gertz requires that
there be "actual injury" caused by the defendant's act, but not that it necessarily be injury
to reputation.
86. See Lebel, supra note 26, at 269, 270. As Professor LeBel has observed:
[T]he Court has recognized that defamatory communications have as much potential
for inflicting such personal injuries as emotional distress as they do for injuring the
reputation of the plaintiff, and therefore, that plaintiffs deserve to be compensated
for these non-reputational harms....
The plaintiff who is unable to establish actual injury to reputation but who can
establish other harm still has a claim for relief that sounds in defamation because
of the capacity or the potential that the communication possesses for causing
reputational injury. It is this capacity for reputationalharm that is at the core of
the defamation action and constitutes the gravamen of the wrongful conduct of the
defendant in publishing material that has this capacity. The fact that on the occasion
of a particular publication the reputational injury was not suffered or, as is more
likely, simply cannot be proved, does not relieve the defendant of the obligation to
compensate the plaintiff for the other foreseeable types of harm that the publication
actually did cause on that occasion.
Id. (footnotes omitted). Limitation of damages, where recoverable at all, to direct pecuniary
harm flowing from injury to reputation, precluding recovery for emotional harm and otherwise
requiring proof that the plaintiff has suffered reputational injury, is a basic tenet of much
current reform thinking. See THE MODEL CoMimUNcATIvE ToRTs AcT (§§ 3-101, 9-101);
Anderson, supra note 58, at 763 (proposing that recovery be conditioned on "proof of some
harm to reputation in every case"); Ingber, supra note 67, at 785 (urging that recovery for
harms be limited to those quantifiable as special, pecuniary rather than general damages);
Lewis, supra note 7, at 615-16 ("allowing recovery for 'mental anguish' or other unmeasureable
harm would allow juries to speculate at large and in effect bring back presumed damages....
The Supreme Court should ... require proof of special damages in all libel cases.").
87. The paradigmatic defamation case is not the aberrational Brown & Williamson
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Punitive damages, the other bite noir of libel reform, are not so easy
a target. Although often treated together with presumed damages, punitive

damages are not unique to defamation nor do they have any compensatory
function; they serve to punish. 8 Perhaps punitive damages-essentially a
private fine-have no place at all in a reasoned damages system; perhaps
they are inherently constitutionally suspect.8 9 Nevertheless, unless we are

prepared to eliminate punitive damages in all actions, there is no sound
basis for eliminating them in defamation actions, where such damages are
subject to intense scrutiny and meaningful standards. Irrespective of the
extent of apparent constitutional permissibility, 9° the common law has

generally conditioned the award of punitive damages on a clear demonstration of the defendant's ill will and intention to inflict harm on the plaintiff.
The issue with punitive damages ... is intentional harm, not
intentional conduct which causes harm ....
Although it is true that

one cannot realistically be deterred from harboring feelings of ill
will toward another, one can be deterred from acting on that ill

Tobacco Corp. v. Jacobson, 827 F.2d 1119, 1142 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.
1302 (1988); see supra note 76. It well may be the more pedestrian Simonds v. Blue CrossBlue Shield of Mich., 629 F. Supp. 369 (W.D. Mich. 1986), in which the plaintiff received
$103,691.94 for documented loss of business attributable to defendant's circulation of a
defamatory letter, $10,000 for physical pain and suffering to which the plaintiff and his wife
testified, and $150,000 for "emotional pain and anguish" from the defendant's accusations
attacking his integrity and to which the plaintiff, his family, friends, and a clinical psychologist
testified. 629 F. Supp. at 384-85; see S. HALPERN, supra note 22, at 154.
88. LeBel, supra note 28, at 273.
The two items of damages [presumed and punitive damages] have different meanings
and different rationales ....
Presumed damages permit compensation for unproven
harm, while punitive damages lack any overt compensatory rational. The fact that
the Supreme Court has chosen to impose the same constitutional restrictions on their
recovery should not lead to a routine failure to recognize their different nature and
function.
Id. (footnote omitted).
89. Although the Supreme Court recently upheld the constitutionality of punitive damages
in a tort action against a claim that they amount to an "excessive fine" impermissible under
the eighth amendment (Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.,
109 S. Ct. 2909 (1989)), the Court expressed no opinion with respect to the constitutionality
of punitive damages as a matter of due process. Cf. id. at 2923-24 (Brennan, J., concurring)
(stating that the majority opinion "leaves the door open for a holding that the Due Process
Clause constrains the imposition of punitive damages in civil cases brought by private parties.").
90. Constitutionally, a private plaintiff suing over a private defamation may recover
punitive damages without a greater fault showing than is necessary for liability (Dun &
Bradstreet Builders, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985)), and it is generally
assumed that Gertz constitutionally permits punitive damages whenever the plaintiff demonstrates the Sullivan type of malice (i.e., knowledge or reckless disregard as to falsity). The
Gertz Court, however, spoke negatively, indicating only the impermissibility of presumed or
punitive damages in the absence of such malice; see Lewis, supra note 7, at 616 (noting that
Justice Powell's language "seems to leave open the possibility that punitive damages may in
time be found too intimidating to free expression to be allowed at all").
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will in such a way as to harm the other. This is precisely the
deterrent objective of punitive damages. 9'
Absent condemnation of all such private fines in all cases, it is difficult to
condemn this kind of punishment imposed on one who has willfully and
maliciously (in the true sense of the word) defamed another. 92
THE

DELICATE BALANCE IN INDELICATE HANDs: A UNITARY APPROACH TO

REFoRm

To retain both damages for intangible actual injury and punitive damages leaves much to the discretion of the jury, however well instructed. The
desire to treat damages in defamation idiosyncratically, which lies at the
heart of much of the well-considered reform proposals, springs from the
conviction that the modern jury either cannot or will not perform its function
properly. This conviction then informs a decision to remove as much as
possible from jury consideration: if jury damages awards are too high,
change the damages rule by eliminating damages or so severely restricting
them that there is no room for jury discretion. The assumption is that,
although equipped to deal with life and liberty, the jury's hands are too
indelicate to be entrusted with matter touching on a fragile first amendment.
Excessive jury verdicts are a serious problem. Indeed, although the
practical severity of the problem is ameliorated by the almost automatic
judicial reversal of questionable jury verdicts, 93 that bizarre fact of appellate
life highlights the cause for concern. However, it does not follow that there
is something inherently inimical to the first amendment in the jury process.
One does not call for the elimination of the jury in every case in which
one of the parties might be unpopular or controversial. The broad generalization of media unpopularity is hardly a sufficient justification for
displacing the jury in defamation actions. Rather than dismiss the jury, we

91. DiSalle v. P.G. Publishing Co., 375 Pa. Super. 510, 558-59, 544 A.2d 1345, 1370
(1988), app. denied, 557 A.2d 724 (Pa. 1989), cert. denied, P.G. Publishing Co. v. DiSalle,
109 S. Ct. 3216 (1989).
92.
As we recently observed, "[c]ourts in libel cases should be guided by the same
general rules regarding damages that govern other types of tort recovery."...
Therefore, perceiving no reason to abandon the traditional requirement for a showing
of actual or apparent ill will toward the plaintiff before allowing punitive damages,
we hold that a public official, who must prove actual malice to establish liability in
a defamation action may not also recover punitive damages absent an additional
finding that the defendant acted with common law malice in publishing the defamatory statement.
Id. But cf. Van Alstyne, supra note 75, at 803-07 (arguing against punitive damages awards
in civil libel cases).
93. Matheson, supra note 75, at 280 ("appellate courts have reversed approximately
eighty percent of the jury verdicts entered against publishers") (footnote omitted); see Bezanson,
supra note 60, at 790 ("Most plaintiffs lose in court."); Franklin, Proposal,supra note 31,
at 4-5.
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might better consider why juries have so much difficulty handling the
problems of defamation.
What is immediately apparent is the issue of capability in the face of
inordinate complexity. The defamation rules and distinctions have reached
such a plane of intricacy that it is not reasonable to expect clear and
consistent jury behavior.9 4 That juries have overcome apparent prejudice is
not remarkable; it is remarkable that on occasion they have been able to
penetrate the maze of defamation and to reach reasoned decisions.95 Simplification of the law of defamation-the goal of virtually all reform
proposals-also can serve to rationalize the jury process. Neither reform
nor effective protection of the press need be at the expense of the jury.
Meaningful reform need not be predicated on the assumption of incompatibility between the jury system and the Constitution. A simplified and less
confusing and expensive defamation scheme, with comprehensible fault and
damages standards, also would be more manageable for a jury.
The various declaratory judgment proposals do simplify the defamation
complex, but at too great a cost to the interest in reputation. Perhaps
motivated by a desire to avoid constitutional problems by eliding them, the

proposals create a parallel remedial system-essentially a dismembered defamation tort-rather than confront the need to reexamine and reformulate
the present constitutional structure.9 The fault/damages trade-off, while
striking at the heart of the darkness of defamation law, also misconceives
the relationship between the components and the consequences of that

94. See Keeton, Defamation and Freedom of the Press, 54 TEx. L. REv. 1221, 1233-35
(1976) (describing twenty-three discrete "decision points" in the typical defamation action).
Securing to persons and other legal entities the good reputation to which they
are entitled and which they have earned, without discouraging the free flow of ideas
and information so important to a free society, has proven a difficult task ....
The
maintenance of this balance has ... engendered a complex doctrinal structure....
The complexity of the law alone is enough to provoke serious criticism. Distinctions
that often seem to be theoretically sound become impractical in the actual administration of justice. [Tlhe notion that a jury can make practical use of theoretical
distinctions is simply a fallacy.
Id. at 1224 (footnotes omitted). "[Critics of the current body of defamation law often point
to the 'actual malice' issue as one that is extraordinarily difficult for juries, and perhaps even
judges, to grasp." LeBel, supra note 28, at 305 (footnote omitted).
95. Exemplary is the particularized jury verdict in Sharon v. Time, Inc., in which the
jury found the utterance false and defamatory but the defendant's conduct lacking in "malice"
albeit negligent; see supra note 46. See also LeBel, The Infliction of Harm Through the
Publication of Fiction: Fashioninga Theory of Liability, 51 BROOKLYN L. REv. 281, 349 n.269
(1985) ("Although it is fashionable to denounce juries in defamation cases, a couple of recent
cases reveal that juries may be able to understand perfectly well what is at stake in such
cases.").
96. The Washington & Lee proposals do attempt a limited reformulation with respect to
the allowance of highly restricted special pecuniary damages without a showing of fault. THE
MODEL COMMUNICATIVE TORTS ACT, Comment to § 3-101. The assumption is that the absence
of presumed and punitive damages and the severe limitations on proven compensatory damages,
together with maintenance of the procedural inhibitions on the plaintiff allow the scheme to
pass constitutional muster. Id.
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relationship. If one eschews reflexive antipathy to substantial compensation
for the victim of irresponsible conduct, it becomes apparent that the
pernicious complexity and expense does not stem from the existence of a
fault requirement or the availability of damages. Rather, the complexity
and expense arise from a multi-tiered fault structure, with Sullivan "malice"
at the apex, intertwined with a set of damages rules that varies with degrees
of fault. A damages-based remedial scheme for defamation, predicated upon
97
the existence of actual injury, consistent with that applicable to other torts,
and not burdened with distinctions based on the public or private nature
of the parties or the utterance, can be applied fairly and effectively in the
context of a similarly unitary fault structure. Creation of a workable and
meaningful structure requires rethinking of the bases of present constitutional doctrine.
If presumed damages were eliminated and punitive damages made
unequivocally dependent upon a clear and convincing showing of intention
to harm, 9 little justification would remain either for differentiating liability
on the basis of who the plaintiff is or for the pernicious Sullivan malice
standard of fault. Rather, a unitary fault standard, 99 predicated on comprehensible concepts of professionalism, can complement a unitary damage
standard to form a clear, consistent and workable frame of reference for
redressing injury to reputation. Effective constitutional checks on the process
then can be provided by extending to all defamation cases the existing
constitutional procedural structure relating to the burden and quantum of
proof and the scope of appellate review. To the extent our proper concern
is with jury bias, the set of constitutional procedural hurdles in the path
of the defamation plaintiff provides an offsetting and controlling mechanism.'Ou

97. See supra notes 74-92 and accompanying text. A damage-based remedial scheme
would contemplate (i) compensatory damages for all actual harms, tangible and intangible,
proximately caused by the defendant; and (ii) punitive damages where intention to harm,
common-law malice, is also demonstrated. Id. See also Halpern, supra note 7, at 316-20.
98. Clearly, limiting compensatory damages to "actual injury" in all cases and conditioning punitive damages on demonstrated ill-will (at least if such demonstration were in
addition to a proof of present constitutional malice) produces a damage complex patently
more restrictive than that presently permissible and one invulnerable to constitutional attack
absent a general interdiction of punitive damages.
99. The unitary system described here is more fully elaborated in Halpern, supra note
7, at 320-25.
A unitary algorithm for damages and procedure is desirable, but if we are to have
simplified reform without an alternative noncompensatory system, the fault complex
itself must be changed. A unitary system, applicable to all claims irrespective of the
nature of the parties or of the utterance, is the sure way to remedy the epicyclic,
unpredictable, and inordinately expensive present system. The need to determine the
public or private nature of both the plaintiff and the utterance, and the application
of an array of standards following from those determinations, taxes not only the
resources of the parties but also the capability of the judicial system.
Id. at 320-21 (footnotes omitted).
100. See Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise of
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In the context of procedural rules amplified to apply to all defamation
plaintiffs and to every element of the cause of action-requiring, for
example, every plaintiff to prove both falsity and fault by clear and
convincing evidence, under a de n6vo judicial review standard-the draconian knowledge-or-reckless disregard burden is essentially obviated. However, there is no sound justification for returning to the aberrational strict,
no-fault liability of the common law. The declaratory judgment proposals,
in trading fault for damages, assault both reputation and speech. Although
it is doubtful at best that a no-fault declaration of falsity can provide
effective redress for the injured plaintiff,101 if and to the extent that it does,
then it also inhibits the publishing defendant. 0 2 It is too late in our
development of both concepts of reputation and the ambit of free speech
to revert to any form of strict liability for speech. The enduring values of
Sullivan are its procedural overlay on the defamation cause of action and
the change from absolute to fault-based liability. Eliminating fault by
eliminating damages is a radical (even if constitutional) departure from the
Sullivan accommodation that does not effectively serve the important interests underlying that accommodation.
On the other hand, what was central to Sullivan was the fault concept
itself, and not the choice of a particular fault standard. That standard,
which has been at the core of the present chaotic state of the law, should
no longer serve as the linchpin of the constitutionalized law of defamation. 03
In lieu of a formulation that has produced an expensive and ineffective
status-based jurisprudence of defamation, we need, consistent with the great
body of tort law, a single, uniform fault standard predicated on the
defendant's behavior, rather than on the defendant's cognitive state.
Although specifically I propose a fault requirement based upon "professional negligence," holding the professional disseminator of information
to the standards of that profession, 104 there may be other similarly based
Religion, 102 HARv. L. REv. 933, 955 nn.81, 82 ("Courts have
adjusting burdens and standards of proof to offset potential jury
press in defamation cases... . No device for eliminating jury bias
percent effective, although perfection may be an unrealistic and

used the ... techniques of
bias against the institutional
can claim to be one hundred
constitutionally unnecessary

goal.").
The procedural hurdles-shifting to the plaintiff the burden of proving fault and
falsity clearly and convincingly, with close, independent appellate scrutiny of the
fact finding process-appear to be the most clearly principled and readily workable
way of accommodating the defamation cause of action to the first amendment.
Halpern, supra note 7, at 320 (footnote omitted).
101. See supra notes 49, 63-73 and accompanying text.
102. Although I seriously question the potency of the scheme, if in fact the retraction/
declaration model has teeth, then those teeth must bite.
103. As I have suggested, "[t]he actual malice standard essentially has served to undercompensate the injured victim of defamation while unduly burdening the entire litigation
process. It has produced 'grossly perverse results'." Halpern, supra note 7, at 321 (quoting
Justice White in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 774
(1985)).
104. See Halpern, supra note 7, at 323-25.
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formulations that would serve as well. Whatever the precise formulation,
the aim should be a serious and workable fault criterion related to the
conduct of the defendant. What is important and necessary is the creation
of a unitary, simplified litigation structure containing both heavy constitutional procedural burdens on the plaintiff and more comprehensible fault
and damage rules by which a jury may be guided to provide effective
compensation and redress for the defamation victim injured through the
fault of the defamer. There is no real disagreement over either the need to
remove the complicating ornamentation from the structure of the law of
defamation or the need to provide fairness to the injured plaintiff and
protection for the innocently erroneous defendant. As the movement for
libel reform gathers more momentum, it is imperative, beyond the specifics
of the reformulation, that we not make the defamation action even more
idiosyncratic. In examining this communicative tort, the concern for communication should not overwhelm the tort.
The Supreme Court, for now, has chosen to avoid the difficult and
necessary reexamination of a constitutionalized law of defamation.105 The
serious issues of fundamental values cannot indefinitely be elided or disposed
of by easy formulae. Meaningful reform, through the states or the Supreme
Court, 10&the legislature or the judiciary, requires candid confrontation with
the complex reality underlying these issues. 0 7 The interest in reputation can
be protected in a manner consistent with the first amendment without

The inquiry under such a standard is not a general search for reasonableness,
nor is it directed to the truly elusive determinations of state of mind that our present
standards require. Rather, the issue is the more specific, objective one of behavior
under existing and peer-recognized professional standards. For the press, the analogue
is to the fault standards applicable to medical or legal malpractice claims-claims
whose resolution certainly have far reaching consequences for the defendants, transcending simply money damages. To make clear that liability will attach to the
demonstrated departure from standards that exist as criteria of professional conduct
is not leaving first amendment protection only to the responsible journalist; it is
asking, just as we ask our doctors and lawyers, that one who purports to be a
professional behave professionally.
Id. at 325 (footnote omitted).
105. The doctrine formed over a quarter century by changing and shaky Court majorities
(see supra notes 8-15) exhibits an inertial quality: the concern was extension of the specific
Sullivan standard rather than realistic review and considered judgment over the continuing
utility of that standard.
106. Arguably (much as THE MODEL COMtNticATrvE TORTS ACT argues in the Comment
to § 3-101, although to a different purpose) the limitation of compensatory damages to actual
injury and addition of an intention to harm requirement to punitive damages, together with
extension of the inhibitory procedural rules to all plaintiffs and all elements of the defamation
cause of action, provide a sufficient constitutional shelter for speech to support a professional
negligence fault standard in all cases. However, that conclusion does require a rethinking of
Sullivan and a substantial overruling of Gertz and the rationale of Greenmoss.
107. "By giving us a view of the past that is complex, challenging, and sometimes
puzzling, [history] can warn against understanding both the perils and possibilities of the
present-and of the future-in simplistic terms." N. ROSENBERo, supra note I, at 268.
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eviscerating the tort or grossly distorting the function of the jury. The
totality of our value system-the individual and societal values in reputation,
in speech and in the jurisprudential process itself-must be respected if
reform is to produce a positive good.

